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Abstract
If migration studies in the 1990s were marked by the predominance of the 
“national models” approach, the early 2000s have seen an increasing rebuttal 
to this approach. This paper contributes to the debate by examining the 
politics of citizenship in Germany and Canada, two countries that are usually 
located at opposing poles of the “national models of immigration and citizen-
ship continuum”. The paper combines inductive process tracing and discourse 
analysis to examine some of the most controversial citizenship legislation 
in both countries: Optionspflicht [the duty to choose] in Germany and the 
“first generation limitation” in Canada. Overall, the analysis presented agrees 
with recent critiques of the national models approach in migration studies. 
However, and in contrast to the latter, it maintains that national trajectories 
– rather than models – provide a cognitive matrix into which policy changes 
and their justifications need to be inserted. 
Keywords: Germany, Canada, citizenship, integration, national models, ethnic/civic 
nation, dual citizenship
1. Introduction1
The beginning of the 21st century has witnessed a tremendous shift in the 
area of comparative migration studies. In the 1990s, it became commonplace 
in comparative approaches to categorize Western immigrant-receiving 
societies into diffferent models of nationhood and citizenship. Scholars 
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favour of the existing models or, increasingly, used empirical data to argue 
that the profffered conceptual models might exist in some laws and policies 
but not in others, and even less so in migrants’ lived experiences. 
In the early 2000s, the adequacy and usefulness of the “national mod-
els” approach in comparative migration studies has become increasingly 
challenged. Some scholars reject the national models perspective and its 
underlying assumption of path-dependency, because they maintain that we 
are currently observing a convergence of European policies pertaining to 
immigration and citizenship; others raise doubts about the epistemological 
and methodological value of comparing national models, arguing that this 
approach often misguides scholars by becoming a self-fulfĳ illing prophecy. 
Concurring with this view, still others have started to develop fĳ ine-grained 
citizenship and immigrant integration indicators en lieu of national models.
In this paper, I contribute to this new scholarship in comparative mi-
gration studies by examining recent changes in citizenship legislation in 
Germany and Canada. These countries’ policies play important roles in the 
recent immigration and citizenship debates as they are usually portrayed 
as occupying opposing poles of the national models of immigration and 
citizenship continuum (Brubaker, 1989; Bauder, 2011). Constructed as the 
prototype of the notorious “ethnic nation”, Germany is said to be in need 
of “learning from Canada” in matters of immigrant integration (Bendel 
& Kreienbrink, 2008; Berlin Institut für Bevölkerung und Entwicklung, 
2012). Canada, by contrast, is widely celebrated – and celebrates itself – 
as a “multicultural nation” and “world leader” in diversity management 
(Kymlicka, 2003). 
Recently, however, both countries have – and, in the case of Canada 
still is – engaged in major overhauls of their citizenship and immigration 
policies. Germany’s 1999 citizenship reform played a major role in calling 
into question the national models approach and its underlying assumption 
of path-dependency. In Canada, multiculturalism remains untouched in law 
and in practices “on the ground” (Banting & Kymlicka, 2014), but has been 
considerably scaled back in policy and discourse since the coming to power 
of the federal Conservatives in 2006. In fact, as Abu-Laban (2014) argues, 
in order to woo “ethnic voters” the Conservatives have refrained from at-
tacking multiculturalism directly, but diminish its scope through changes 
to related policies, including immigration and citizenship. Canada has 
also been actively looking to Europe for inspiration in its ongoing citizen-
ship reform. In this context, it has been claimed that there is increasingly 
convergence between German and Canadian integration and citizenship 
policies (Triadafĳilopoulos, 2012). 
31 WINTER
TRADITIONS OF NATIONHOOD OR POLITICAL CONJUNC TURE?
These developments raise questions about the nature of ongoing changes 
pertaining to citizenship legislation in Germany and Canada: are they 
generic and characterized by increasing convergence or are they primarily 
determined by specifĳ ic traditions of nationhood? What are the political 
solutions proposed, and how (dis)similar are interpretations of “good 
citizenship” in both countries?
Dual citizenship constitutes an intriguing case in this respect, since 
the provisions in both countries remain diametrically opposed: Canada 
tolerates dual citizenship, Germany does not. In this paper, I focus on two 
specifĳ ic dimensions of dual citizenship law and their surrounding debates: 
Optionspflicht [the duty to choose] in Germany and the “fĳ irst generation 
limitation” in Canada2. As I demonstrate below, these two provisions are 
arguably the most controversial dimensions within these countries’ respec-
tive citizenship laws. Furthermore, how these provisions have come into 
being and how they are debated in the political arena reveal both some 
particularistic, nation-specifĳic concerns, as well as some general ideological 
(party-) diffferences. 
In the remainder of this paper, I fĳ irst review the national models theory 
in comparative migration studies and its most salient critiques. I then briefly 
outline the methodology used here. In the main sections of this paper, I 
discuss the German and Canadian cases, which leads me to identify the 
salience of the two debates described above and to an analysis of the respec-
tive parliamentary discourses. In the conclusion, I show how comparing 
these two cases contributes to the ongoing debate about national models 
and explain what both countries could learn from each other.
2. Theoretical Perspectives
If the distinction between diffferent types of nationhood can be traced 
back to the writings of Friedrich Meinecke, Hans Kohn, and Louis Dumont, 
its importance for contemporary debates on immigrant integration and 
citizenship was reinstated by Rogers Brubaker (1992, p. 1), who, in 1992, 
argued that “France and Germany have been constructing, elaborating, 
and furnishing to other states distinctive, even antagonistic models of 
nationhood and self-understanding”. According to Brubaker, today’s poli-
tics of immigration and citizenship are still (path-)dependent upon these 
countries’ deeply seated styles of national self-understanding. 
Although Brubaker did not use the term “model” systematically (Finotelli 
& Michalowski, 2012, p. 233) in the wake of his groundbreaking work it 
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became common to distinguish between two if not three distinct ideal types 
of nationhood, citizenship, and immigrant integration. First, Germany with 
its long-standing tradition of blood-based citizenship ( jus sanguinis) came 
to be known as both the prototype of the “ethnic nation” and the “exclusion-
ary model” of citizenship as it excluded long-term permanent residents 
and their children (born on German soil, but not of German descent) from 
naturalization. Second, France, where the acquisition of citizenship by birth 
on national territory ( jus soli) is common, was increasingly depicted as the 
closest possible incarnation of the ideal type of the “civic nation” and/or 
the “republican model” of citizenship due to its emphasis on immigrant as-
similation. While the ethnic/civic dichotomy was the most widely discussed 
framework in the study of the ways states deal with ethnic and cultural 
diversity, a number of scholars have added a third “model”, namely that of 
the “pluralistic-civic nation”, which encourages multiculturalism, that is the 
maintenance and public expression of ethnic group identities in addition 
to a shared national identity (Castles, 1995). The countries that have come 
to stand for this type of citizenship tradition are Canada and Australia, and 
to a lesser extent the Netherlands and Sweden. 
In the fĳ irst decade of the new century, the utility of these ideal types 
for comparative migration research has come under intense scrutiny. 
Interestingly, it was policy and not primarily academic contemplation 
that kicked-started an entirely new wave of scholarship and debate. On 
the one hand, in 2000, Germany introduced conditional citizenship rights 
based upon birth on its national territory ( jus soli) and non-discretionary 
naturalization. It thereby invited debate about the extent in which it had left 
its previously assumed path of perpetuating a citizenship regime based on 
the model of ethnic nationhood. On the other hand, scholars observed the 
emergence of a retreat from multicultural policies (Joppke, 2007) in the late 
1990s in the Netherlands, which then spread throughout Europe in the years 
after the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington on 11 September 
2001 (for a critical appraisal, see Banting & Kymlicka, 2014). Both develop-
ments sparked the need to reconsider the existence of nationally specifĳ ic 
and fairly path-dependent models of dealing with immigrant integration 
and citizenship. Even with respect to the United States and Canada, past 
scholarship may have overestimated these countries’ pluralist traditions 
of nation-building (Bloemraad, forthcoming).
Overall, we can diffferentiate between three critiques of the national 
models perspective and their respective bodies of literature. First, the 
underlying path dependency of national models approach has come under 
attack by scholars who argue there is a weakening with respect to national 
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distinctiveness. If, as the concept of path dependency predicts, the choices 
and institutional arrangements of the past determine political responses of 
the present, convergence of radically diffferent national models is precluded. 
This, however, is exactly what scholars observe in the early 2000s: “Western 
European states’ policies on immigrant integration are increasingly con-
verging” (Joppke, 2007, p. 1; for critical perspectives on the “convergence” 
thesis, see Jacobs & Rea, 2007; Michalowski, 2011; Mouritsen, 2012). If this 
observation is correct, national models alone no longer provide sufffĳ icient 
explanation. 
Searching for alternative explanations of said convergences, scholars 
have pointed to the impact of a globally shared normative context (Triada-
fĳilopoulos, 2012), as well as to a global flow of knowledge and “best practices” 
(for an example of “best practices” being spread, see Entzinger, 2004). It 
has also been argued that the influence of party politics and ideologies on 
shaping political responses should not be underestimated (Gerdes & Faist, 
2006; Triadafĳilopoulos, 2012). From this perspective, political conjuncture 
rather than persistent traditions of nationhood seem to be the determining 
factor in shaping contemporary politics of citizenship. 
A second set of scholars critiques the epistemological and methodologi-
cal value of using a national models approach for the comparative study 
of immigrant integration and citizenship (Duyvendak & Scholten, 2011; 
Finotelli & Michalowski, 2012). They are particularly concerned by the fact 
that scholars often mistakenly take ideal types at face value, and shape their 
analyses in a way that either confĳirms or contradicts the national model 
(see contributions to a forum debate in Council for European Studies, 2010).
Third, and as a consequence of the two aforementioned critiques, 
scholars are developing alternatives to the national models approach. In 
recent years, we have seen a number of cross-country analyses involving 
fĳ ine-grained citizenship and immigrant integration indicators (Howard, 
2009; Goodman, 2010; Helbling & Vink, 2013, forthcoming). These studies go 
beyond comparing national ideologies and citizenship acquisition rules in 
law and in practice; rather they also take into consideration requirements 
such as legal residence, language skills, and citizenship tests. Although 
the results of the present study speak mostly to the fĳ irst two critiques of 
the national models approach, they will also shed some light on the use of 
citizenship and integration indicators.
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3. Methodology
German and Canadian policies have played important roles in the recent 
immigration and citizenship debates. While they are usually situated at 
opposing poles with respect to immigration and citizenship policies, as 
well as discourses (Bauder, 2011), it has recently been claimed that their 
national imaginaries and citizenship policies have become characterized 
by increasing convergence (Triadafĳilopoulos, 2012). 
In order to probe the extent that traditions of nationhood have an efffect 
on current citizenship debates, two methodological approaches are used. 
For each country, applying inductive process tracing (Beach & Pedersen, 
2013) as a fĳ irst step, the most salient challenges pertaining to citizenship 
legislation are detected and situated within the overall political context. 
Process tracing aims to identify causal efffects; specifĳ ically, I am interested 
in how and why some of the most controversial citizenship legislations 
were implemented. 
In a second step, the revival of doubts over Optionsregelung 3 in the 
German Bundestag (Lower House of the German Parliament) and Bundesrat 
(Upper House of the German Parliament) in the summer of 2013, and the 
debates over the “fĳ irst generation limitation” in the Canadian Parliament in 
the spring of 2008, will be examined. The transcripts of the relevant debates 
were collected from the respective government websites. For Germany, 
three documents were chosen, namely transcripts of one debate in the 
Bundestag (on 5 June) and of two debates in the Bundesrat (on 7 June and 5 
July). For Canada, six documents have been identifĳ ied, namely transcripts 
of debates in the House of Commons (three meetings of the Standing Com-
mittee on Citizenship and Immigration in February 2008) and the Senate 
(one senate meeting and two meetings of the Standing Senate Committee 
on Social Afffairs, Science and Technology)4.
All documents were analysed by using inductive conventional qualita-
tive content analysis (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005) to identify the most im-
portant themes brought forth in the debate. The coding scheme included 
country-specifĳ ic themes, such as “Optionsregelung discriminates against 
Turks” or “First generation limitation risks causing statelessness”, as well 
as shared themes like “multiple citizenship is/should be a normality in the 
21st century”. The analysis will show that some country-specifĳ ic themes 
translate into similar concerns in the other country; compare for example 
the following themes: “Optionsregelung avoids legal problems related to 
dual citizenship” and “fĳ irst generation limitation avoids legal problems”.
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4. Germany
4.1 Coming to terms with dual citizenship
Hotly debated at the time of its implementation on 1 January, 2000, Op-
tionsregelung reappeared on the political agenda in June 2013, when media 
began to report statistics showing that “every three days a German youth 
turns into a foreigner” (MiGAZIN, 2013). 
Optionsregelung, offfĳ icially known as §29 of the German Citizenship 
Act (Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz, StAG), stipulates that upon adulthood 
(between the ages of 18 and 23), individuals who acquired citizenship 
through the newly introduced principle of jus soli must choose between 
their German citizenship and the citizenship handed down to them through 
jus sanguinis by their non-German parents. Failure to provide evidence of 
the revocation of the citizenship obtained through jus sanguinis results in 
the loss of German citizenship. 
In fact, Optionspflicht was retroactively extended to all children who 
were born on German soil by non-national parents since 1990. Thus, 2013 was 
the fĳ irst year when the fĳ irst young Germans (approximately 3400 individu-
als in 2013) holding dual citizenship were turning 23 years of age. As the 
fĳ irst generation afffected by Optionspflicht, they are forced to renounce their 
second citizenship or they are told, upon their 23rd birthday, that they are 
no longer German citizens. As a consequence of this stipulation, Germany 
lost 68 citizens through automatic citizenship revocation in the fĳ irst fĳ ive 
months of 2013 alone (MiGAZIN, 2013). In November 2013, this number had 
increased to 176 (anonymous, 2013). The political debates triggered by these 
losses are examined further below. I fĳ irst situate this particular stipulation 
pertaining to dual citizenship within the wider legal and political context 
of the German citizenship law. 
Germany owes its notorious reputation of being an “ethnic nation” 
in part to a centralized citizenship law, the 1913 Reichs- und Staatsange-
hörigkeitsgesetz (RuStAG). The RuStAG made the principle of descent ( jus 
sanguinis) the only basis of citizenship (Brubaker, 1992, pp. 165-167). This 
affforded refugees and displaced persons of German background (Auslands-
deutsche) settlement rights. According to the same logic, migrant workers 
from Italy, the former Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey that arrived in the 
Federal Republic between 1955 and 1973 remained “foreigners”. After the 
demise of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in 1989, the RuStAG 
allowed Übersiedler (Germans from the GDR) and large numbers of Aus-
siedler (resettlers of German background) from Eastern Europe and the 
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former Soviet Union to receive German citizenship automatically, while 
long-term “foreigners” of non-German background could only be included 
as “denizens” (Hammar, 1989). 
In 1998, a new coalition government of Social Democrats (SPD) and the 
Green Party (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen) acknowledged that Germany had 
become a de facto “country of immigration” and proposed a reform of the 
citizenship law in which citizenship would be granted to children born in 
Germany through the introduction of jus soli, and dual citizenship would be 
tolerated for those wishing to naturalize (Howard, 2008). The government’s 
proposal was vehemently rejected by the opposition of Christian Democrats 
(CDU/CSU) who maintained that dual citizenship would privilege migrants 
over Germans, lead to a dramatic increase of immigration, and undermine 
the Ausländers’ loyalty to Germany, thereby hindering their successful 
integration. The party’s resistance was channelled through a signature 
campaign against dual citizenship coinciding with the provincial election 
in the Land Hesse in February 1999. This tactic proved to be successful: it 
helped the Christian Democrats to win the Land election and subsequently 
the majority in the Bundesrat (Klärner, 2000). The bill that fĳ inally emerged 
out of subsequent negotiations was passed by the Bundestag on 7 May 1999, 
cleared by the Bundesrat on 21 May 1999, and became law on 1 January 2000. 
Despite having been watered-down from the original proposition, the 
German Citizenship Act (Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz, StAG) represented “a 
seismic shift in German citizenship law and a fĳ irm change of direction away 
from its previous ethno-cultural emphasis” (Green, 2000, p. 114; see also Ger-
des & Faist, 2006; Howard, 2012, p. 40; Palmowski, 2008, p. 560; Heckmann, 
2003, p. 45). First, the new law introduced the territorial principle ( jus soli) 
to the existing German citizenship law based on descent ( jus sanguinis)5. 
Second, it reduced the mandatory residence requirement for naturalization 
from 15 to eight years. Third, despite maintaining Germany’s long tradition 
of rejecting dual citizenship, the Act introduces some exceptions to this 
rule, covering recognized refugees, individuals over 60 years of age, and 
nationals of certain EU member-states. It also provides for dual citizenship 
on a temporary basis: According to §29 StAG, children born on German soil 
are granted dual citizenship. However, as already mentioned, at the age of 23 
they have to decide whether to remain Germans or take up the citizenship 
passed down by their parents (Optionsregelgung).
While there is no doubt that the 2000 Citizenship Act was a step in the 
right direction, many scholars also express reservations. In the words of 
Howard (2012, p. 39), “Germany’s major ‘liberalizing change’ was also tem-
pered by a signifĳ icant ‘restrictive backlash’”. Clearly the most controversial 
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element of the new law is the stipulation that new citizens give up their 
previous citizenship (for details on the Optionsregelung, see Schönwälder 
& Triadafĳilopoulos, 2012; Worbs, Scholz, & Blicke, 2012).
In the following years, two sets of amendments were implemented that 
reinforced the Citizenship Act’s assimilatory naturalization requirements 
and its dual standards regarding dual citizenship (Green, 2012, p. 177). The 
fĳirst amendment, the Residence Act (Aufenthaltsgesetz), is part of Germany’s 
fĳ irst ever Immigration Act (Zuwanderungsgesetz), which came into efffect 
on 1 January 2005. The most important changes were the introduction of 
integration courses for immigrants and citizenship candidates (Winter & 
John, 2009), and a mandatory criminal background check (Regelanfrage) 
of all citizenship candidates by the Federal Offfĳ ice of the Protection of the 
Constitution (Bundesverfassungsschutz) to determine whether applicants 
constitute a threat to Germany’s constitutional order (Bundesministerium 
des Inneren, 2008; Hailbronner, 2006, p. 241)6. 
The second amendment of the Citizenship Act came into efffect in August 
2007 as part of the transposition of 11 EU directives into German law (Gesetz 
zur Umsetzung aufenthalts- und asylrechtlicher Richtlinien der Europäischen 
Union). Among other things, the amended Citizenship Act introduced a 
mandatory federal citizenship test as a prerequisite of naturalization 
(Winter & John, 2009)7, and permitted the toleration of dual citizenship 
for all citizens of EU member-states and Switzerland. 
Overall, it seems adequate to say that the high hopes that were associated 
with the reform of Germany’s citizenship law have only modestly been 
fulfĳilled. Specifĳically, there was a widespread expectation – even anxiety for 
some – that there was going to be a signifĳ icant increase in naturalizations. 
In fact, the opposite has been the case. While there was a surge of 187,000 
naturalizations in total in 2000, the year the new act came into efffect, 
naturalization rates have since fallen even though the average residence 
period was on the rise (Green, 2012, p. 179). In 2012, for example, only 112,300 
individuals naturalized (this amounts to a naturalization rate of 1.46 %; cf. 
Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland, 2014). 
Indeed, Germany is now facing a situation in which “long-term resident 
non-nationals are increasingly choosing not to naturalize” (Green, 2012, p. 
180, emphasis in original). According to the Immigrant Citizens Survey, 
the main reasons for this “choice” are, in decreasing order: the required 
renunciation of previous citizenship, the perception of little diffference 
between holding German citizenship and residency status in the country, 
no plans to settle indefĳinitely in Germany, and perceptions that the natu-
ralization procedure is too difffĳ icult (Huddleston & Dag Tjaden, 2012, p. 76; 
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see also Weinmann, Becher, & Babka von Gostomski, 2012)8. Furthermore, 
as mentioned above, since 1 January 2013, Germany is also losing citizens 
through automatic revocations of citizenship.
4.2 Debating Optionspflicht
In spring 2013, the opposition parties in the German Bundestag introduced 
motions proposing the abolishment of Optionspflicht (Bündnis 90/Die 
Grünen), the acceptance of dual citizenship (SPD), and the facilitation of 
naturalization (Die Linke). These were voted down by the then governing 
coalition of Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) and Liberals (FDP) (Deutscher 
Bundestag, 2013). The debate continued in the German Bundesrat where 
seven of the 16 German Länder introduced a bill on the abrogation of Option-
sregelung (Deutscher Bundesrat, 2013a). After having been further discussed 
in the respective committees, the proposition of the bill was accepted in 
the Bundesrat in July, where the majority of Länder was governed by the 
SPD alone or in coalition with the Green Party and/or the Left Party. It was 
then forwarded to the Bundestag (Deutscher Bundesrat, 2013b). 
Taken together, the debate in both Houses was dominated by six themes 
clearly split along party lines: the opposition parties (SPD, Bündnis90/
Die Grünen, and Die Linke) argued in favour of dual citizenship and the 
abrogation of Optionsregelung, while the governing coalition of Liberals 
(FDP)9 and Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) insisted upon the status quo. 
Let us take a look fĳ irst at how members of the opposition parties framed 
the issue10. A reoccurring theme views Optionsregelung as discriminatory, 
and this specifĳ ically against Germans of Turkish origin. Optionsregelung 
is portrayed as an example of “targeted discrimination against migrants, 
especially against Turkish citizens in Germany” (Sevim Dağdelen, Die 
Linke, Deutscher Bundestag, 2013, p. 30597)11. This is because 18.5 percent of 
Germany’s almost 16 million Menschen mit Migrationshintergrund (persons 
with a migratory background) are of Turkish origin (bpb, 2010). By contrast, 
citizens of European Union member states are exempt from the requirement 
to renounce their previous citizenship:
Currently, 300,000 young Germans are subjected to Optionszwang, whereby 
they have to decide between one citizenship or the other. Seventy percent 
of them have Turkish roots. This demonstrates that Optionszwang is being 
deliberately applied one-sidedly (Renate Künast, Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, 
Deutscher Bundestag, 2013, p. 30597).
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The opposition has repeatedly argued against the logic of turning German-
born citizens into foreigners. “We turn people, of whom the majority is 
even born here and therefore are born Germans, into foreigners in their 
own country. This is absurd” (Renate Künast, Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, 
Deutscher Bundestag, 2013, p. 30597). According to the opposition parties, 
dual citizenship does not hinder integration but rather promotes it. The 
view taken here is that citizenship acquisition is a starting point for the 
integration process and not its end; the integration of newcomers is said to 
be likely more successful when they are part of the citizenry.
Integration is more successful when one possesses the citizenship of the 
respective country. Why do we want to force people to cut their familiar 
social and cultural roots in order to receive German citizenship? There are 
no rational reasons for this requirement. Rather, [we are dealing with] a 
totally antiquated law that needs to be eliminated (Guntram Schneider, SPD, 
Minister of Labour, Integration and Social Afffairs in Nordrhein-Westfalen, 
Deutscher Bundesrat, 2013a, p. 305)
The second part of the latter quote above speaks to one of the weaker 
themes that can be found in the opposition parties’ discourse, namely 
the representation of dual or even multiple citizenship as a normal state 
of afffairs in the 21st century (Bilkay Öney, SPD, Minister of Integration in 
Baden-Württemberg, Deutscher Bundesrat, 2013a, pp. 301-302).
In the examined debates, the government and members of the ruling par-
ties vehemently oppose these positions. They maintain that the toleration of 
dual citizenship would lower immigrants’ effforts to integrate and “devalu-
ate German citizenship” (“deutsche Staatsbürgerschaft verramschen”, Ole 
Schröder, Christian Democrats, Parliamentary Secretary of State at the 
Ministry of the Interior, Deutscher Bundestag, 2013, p. 30592). The most 
important themes used by the Christian Democrats and Liberal Party are 
“only single citizenship promotes integration” and “Optionsregelung avoids 
legal problems related to dual citizenship”. Specifĳ ically, dual or multiple 
citizenship is framed as entailing a conflict of loyalty – split between the 
“home country” and the country of settlement. Secondly, dual or multiple 
citizenship is viewed as causing legal ambiguities. Both dimensions are 
present in the citation below:
Multiple citizenship entails conflicts of loyalty. Many times, this kind of 
cherry-picking leads to great dilemmas, for instance in the penal law and 
the right to vote. It cannot be possible that a person is allowed to vote for 
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the national parliament in two countries […] or to collect social benefĳ its 
[…] in two countries. Concrete cases of conflict also exist with regards to 
the purchase of property or with respect to inheritance law, [as well as] 
diplomatic protection (Stephan Mayer (Altötting), CDU/CSU, Deutscher 
Bundestag, 2013, p. 30607).
If dual citizenship is perceived as causing conflicts of loyalty and identity, 
only single citizenship is viewed as being a guarantor for successful integra-
tion: 
The persons concerned, who have a German passport, do not decide against 
their social and cultural origin, […], but rather for a future in Germany. 
They can continue to practice their mother tongue, to keep in touch with 
their family, and they can always visit their parents’ country of origin. The 
introduction of Optionsmodell does not change this. Cultural and societal 
diversity is not dependent on multiple citizenship (Ole Schröder, CDU, 
Parlamentary Secretary of State at the Ministry of the Interior, Deutscher 
Bundestag, 2013, p. 30593).
Despite Christian Democrats’ strong positions against dual citizenship for 
young German’s “with a migratory background”, the outcomes of the federal 
election may have introduced change: the new coalition contract signed by 
the Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) and Social Democrats in November 
2013 stipulates the abolition of Optionspflicht: “Immigrants shall become 
citizens. Those born and raised in German shall keep their German passport 
and shall not be forced to choose [between one citizenship or the other]” 
(Bundesregierung Deutschland, 2013, pp. 9-10). However, for everyone else, 
the general intolerance of dual citizenship remains unchanged (Bundesr-
egierung Deutschland, 2013, p. 74).
5. Canada
5.1 Circumventing “citizens of convenience”
In January 2006, after 13 years of Liberal rule, the Conservative Party of 
Canada was voted into offfĳ ice, fĳ irst as a minority government (in 2006 and 
2008) and then as a majority government in 2011. The shift from a Liberal 
to Conservative government coincided with the defeat of the separatist 
Parti Québécois by the Quebec Liberals in 2003 and other crucial events, 
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such as the Lebanon war in 2006, the subsequent evacuation of Canadian 
expatriates, and the implementation of the Western Hemisphere Travel 
Initiative in 2007, which stipulates that Canadians and Americans provide 
passports, rather than drivers’ licences or birth certifĳ icates, when crossing 
their shared border. 
These events were crucial. The fear of Québécois separatism was partly 
to blame for the fact that citizenship reform had been kept on hold for more 
than 20 years (Garcea, 2006; Winter, 2013). Once this obstacle was removed, 
the other two events became catalysts for a series of citizenship reforms, 
beginning in 2007 and having yet to end. The fĳ irst legal change pertains 
to an amendment to the Canadian Citizenship Act, which was passed by 
Parliament in the spring of 2008 and took efffect on 17 April 2009. 
The amendment contains two clauses, one of which had been a long time 
in the making and highly publicized in offfĳicial discourses, the government’s 
website, and the media. The so-called “repatriation clause” was intended 
to bring Canada’s citizenship law in line with its 1982 Constitution, and 
specifĳ ically its Charter of Rights and Freedoms. It rectifĳ ies a number of 
odd and even discriminatory provisions of the 1947 Citizenship Act (e.g. 
citizenship determination based on wedlock, distinction between foreign-
born and native-born in cases of citizenship revocation) that had already 
been addressed in Canada’s Citizenship Act of 1977, but not retroactively. 
The second clause is commonly known as the “fĳ irst generation limita-
tion”. It implements a post-2009 citizenship category for the fĳ irst generation 
of Canadians born abroad stipulating that they can no longer pass citizen-
ship on to their children if the latter are also born abroad. In other words, it 
restricts the inheritance of Canadian citizenship to the fĳ irst generation of 
children born abroad to Canadian citizens. This is a signifĳ icant departure 
from Canada’s previous citizenship law, under which Canadians could pass 
on their citizenship to future generations born abroad, on the condition that 
those foreign-born Canadians afffĳ irm their desire for Canadian citizenship 
by their early 20s. 
While not introduced as a circumscription of dual citizenship, the “fĳ irst 
generation limitation” is efffectively linked to dual citizenship: Canada is 
a signatory of the 1961 United Nations Convention on the Reduction of 
Statelessness, and in cases where individuals born abroad to Canadians in 
the second generation became stateless (e.g. both parents are Canadians 
and the child is born in a country that does not provide for jus soli), special 
provisions will come into play (see also Brouwer, 2012).
Compared to its sister clause, the “fĳ irst generation limitation” came 
as a surprise to many observers. It was hardly debated in Parliament and 
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received little public attention by either the government or the media. The 
few debates in Parliament between the proposition of the bill in December 
2007 and its acceptance in April 2008 are examined further below. I fĳ irst 
situate this particular clause within the wider legal and political context 
of the Canadian citizenship law. 
Independent Canadian citizenship was fĳ irst introduced in 1947. The 
fĳ irst Citizenship Act altered the status of the Canadian people from British 
subjects to Canadian citizens and introduced formal criteria – in addition to 
jus sanguinis and jus soli – of how one could become a naturalized Canadian. 
It also instituted formal citizenship hearings and citizenship ceremonies. 
Dual citizenship was not tolerated. 
If the fĳ irst two decades of Canadian citizenship were characterized by a 
strong nationalization of citizenship, driven by the desire to become distinct 
from Britain, they were followed by two decades of de-ethnicization (Win-
ter, 2013). It is the second phase of Canada’s citizenship regime between the 
mid-1960s and mid-1980s to which Canada owes much of its international 
reputation as a “world leader” in immigration, diversity accommodation, and 
multiculturalism. In 1967, the Canadian federal government implemented a 
supposedly “race blind” immigration policy. In 1971, Prime Minister Pierre 
Trudeau declared that “multiculturalism within a bilingual framework” 
not only constituted an offfĳ icial state policy, but was also the essence of 
Canadian identity (House of Commons, 1971, p. 8545). Multiculturalism 
was recognized in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982; 
it became law through the 1988 Multiculturalism Act. 
The Citizenship Act of 1977 can be seen as a corollary of the afore-
mentioned policies. Reducing the residence requirement for citizenship 
candidates from fĳive to three years, entirely removing all special treatment 
of British nationals in the citizenship application, and, most importantly, 
allowing dual citizenship, the 1977 Citizenship Act modernized Canada’s 
citizenship regime and complemented its new pluralist approach to im-
migration, integration, and national identity transformation. As Nyers (2010, 
p. 52) puts it, “With the passage of the 1977 legislation, Canadian citizenship 
was redesigned to allow for multiple allegiances and forms of belonging”. 
Canadian citizenship had become, almost literally, “multicultural”.
In 1995, the format of the Canadian citizenship test was changed from 
an oral citizenship hearing to a “pencil and paper” standardized multiple-
choice test12. A multiple choice exam taken simultaneously by a large 
number of citizenship candidates presented itself as a low-cost alternative 
to time-consuming individual interviews with citizenship judges. 
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The 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks and subsequent American-led 
global “war on terror” prompted a number of policy initiatives in the security 
realm13. Canadian citizenship legislation, however, remained unchanged, 
and this during a time when Germany and other European countries were 
heavily invested in reshaping their citizenship policies. Hence, in the early 
2000s, citizenship acquisition continued to be seen as part of immigrants’ 
integration process (and not as its “fĳ irst price”, cf. Paquet, 2012). Canada’s 
exceptionally high naturalization rates of over 75% (OECD, 2012, p. 134) 
were viewed as a sign of successful settlement and integration policies 
(Bloemraad, 2006). Dual citizenship was interpreted in both neoliberal 
and multicultural terms, namely as fostering the prospects of business 
opportunities by Canadian transnational entrepreneurs. 
The amendment to the Citizenship Act passed in 2008 was the fĳ irst 
major citizenship reform in 30 years, with the fĳ irst requests for change 
having been brought up under Progressive Conservative Prime Minister 
Brian Mulroney in 1987 and pursued unsuccessfully under Jean Chrétien’s 
Liberal government in the subsequent years (Garcea, 2006). It remains the 
only major legal reform to citizenship to date. While there has been an 
unprecedented number of policy and legal changes in the areas of immigra-
tion and refugee protection (Alboim & Cohl, 2012), as well as signifĳ icant 
modifĳ ication to Canada’s citizenship rules, the vast majority of the latter 
are located at the policy level or have taken efffect only through bureaucratic 
changes (Winter, 2014a). 
5.2 Debating the “fĳirst generation limitation”
The two clauses to amend the Canadian Citizenship Act passed on 17 
April 2008 gain their meaning from very diffferent political contexts. The 
“repatriation clause” had been in the making for a long time. When certain 
stipulations of Canada’s fĳ irst Citizenship Act were addressed in 1977, but 
not retroactively, Canadian offfĳ icials were soon confronted with so-called 
“Lost Canadians”. Lost Canadians is the shorthand for individuals who lost 
or never gained Canadian citizenship due to what is now seen as discrimina-
tory stipulations of the 1947 Citizenship Act based on gender, marital status, 
place of birth, and non-toleration of dual citizenship. In order to bring 
Canadian citizenship law in line with the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 
these injustices needed to be addressed in policy and not only through the 
courts (Anderson, 2006). Hence, the long-term aim for citizenship reform 
that had been stalled by national unity considerations for over 20 years. 
In addition, many of these Lost Canadians lived or live in the United 
States and/or considered themselves to be dual American-Canadian citi-
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zens. When the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative came into efffect in 
January 2007 it required Canadians and Americans to provide passports 
when crossing their shared border. When applying for a Canadian passport 
many individuals were surprised to learn they were not entitled to hold 
Canadian citizenship due to the aforementioned stipulations in the 1947 
Citizenship Act. The “repatriation clause” helps these individuals to gain or 
regain Canadian citizenship regardless of dual citizenship considerations 
(Winter, 2014b). 
In marked contrast, the “fĳ irst generation limitation” does not address a 
long-standing concern in Canadian policy. Rather, it is widely seen as a swift 
political move in response to public outcry in the wake of the 2006 Israel–
Hezbollah war in Lebanon. Attempting to protect their citizens trapped 
in a foreign country, many states spent considerable resources evacuating 
their stranded citizens. Approximately 15,000 Canadians (which is only a 
fraction of the 40,000 estimated Canadians residing or visiting Lebanon at 
the time) were evacuated to Canada on ships, chartered commercial flights 
and Canadian Forces aircraft at a total estimated cost of CAD 85 million. 
After the evacuation, it was alleged that many of the evacuees were 
dual citizens of Canada and Lebanon and that many had never lived in or 
even visited Canada. In the course of the public debate, the term “citizens 
of convenience” was coined. The term suggests that immigrants and their 
children obtain and maintain Canadian citizenship without having mean-
ingful ties to Canada (Worthington, 2006). They use Canada as a “hotel” 
where they can check in and out when it suits them in order to ensure access 
to social benefĳits, economic opportunities, and a safe place in times of war 
or economic recession (Kent, 2008). 
Contrary to the German debates on abrogating Optionspflicht, the Cana-
dian debates are dominated by the positions put forth by the Conservative 
government. The most important theme relates to the “fĳ irst generation 
limitation” ensuring that Canadian citizens have “a real connection to this 
country” (The Hon. Diane Finley, P.C., M.P., Minister of Citizenship and 
Immigration, Standing Senate Committee on Social Afffairs, 2008)
The position argued is that Canadian citizens should genuinely identify 
with Canada and that the “legacy of Canadian citizenship should not con-
tinue to be passed on through endless generations living abroad” (Wilbert 
J. Keon, Conservative, Senate, 2008), since it would produce “Canadian 
citizens without any knowledge of our country, its history, and its values” 
(Wilbert J. Keon, Conservative, Senate, 2008). Hence, the clause is presented 
as key to “protecting citizenship for the future” (Wilbert J. Keon, Conserva-
tive, Senate, 2008). Although two diffferent types of citizens are at stake 
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here – those born within the country in the case of Optionsregelung and 
those born in the second generation outside the country in the case of 
“fĳ irst generation limitation” – the “integration” argument from the German 
context translates easily into the “real connection” theme in the Canadian 
context.
Furthermore, Conservative MPs hold that legal ambiguities can be 
avoided by introducing the fĳ irst generation limitation. While this reason-
ing resembles the position of the members of Germany’s then-governing 
parties on not tolerating dual citizenship, it is far less frequently used in 
the Canadian context. This is understandable since dual citizenship itself 
continues to be an option for Canadians – at least for the time being. 
The most important concern of Canada’s opposition parties is that the 
new legislation, if passed, might lead to statelessness, which, as mentioned 
above, is to be avoided not merely for humanitarian reasons, but also in 
order to respect Canada’s international obligations. The evidence brought 
forth suggests that many Canadians, and specifĳ ically those of the political 
class, feel concerned by the new law since they – or someone they know – 
live(s) fairly international lives14. In addition, it is also argued that it might 
be unfair to deny Canadians born abroad in the fĳ irst generation to pass 
on their citizenship. The scenario cited most often is that of a child born 
“by accident” outside of Canada in the second generation to a family that 
previously lived in Canada and/or returns to Canada soon after the birth 
of the child:
Suppose, for example, a Canadian couple are spending a few years working 
abroad and give birth outside Canada to a baby. Let’s call her Anna. It [sic] 
could actually be a soldier. She is a Canadian citizen through her parents. 
The family returns to Canada when Anna is six months old and she grows 
up in Canada. […] As a young adult, she chooses to study abroad and fĳ inds 
herself pregnant. If she gives birth to her child outside Canada, the child is 
not a Canadian citizen under the terms of Bill C-37 (Hon. Andrew Telegdi, 
Liberal, Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration, 2008a).
Cases of children “accidentally” and “unfairly” losing Canadian citizen-
ship are also at the sources of another theme, which describes the fĳ irst 
generation limitation as potentially creating “a whole slew of new Lost 
Canadians” (Hon. Jim Karygiannis, Liberal, Scarborough – Agincourt, 
Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration, 2008b). Members 
of the opposition parties maintain that some individuals who are denied 
Canadian citizenship for being born in the second generation abroad may 
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actually have or eventually develop a genuine connection to Canada. This 
is likely to happen when they or their parents continue to embrace and 
practice Canadian values and traditions.
Finally, as in the German debates, one of the least frequent arguments 
brought forth in favour of dual or multiple citizenship is that it has become 
“a normality” in the 21st century (e.g. Donald Galloway, Standing Senate 
Committee on Social Afffairs, 2008). 
In February 2014, the Canadian government introduced a new citizen-
ship bill. If passed, this reform will ease the provisions of citizenship revoca-
tion for some dual citizens, namely those convicted of terrorism. Some 
observers also predict the some kind of “two-tier citizenship” for Canadian 
dual citizens who “have limited connection to Canada” (Morse, 2014).
6. Conclusion
What can specifĳ ic provisions of citizenship law, such as Optionspflicht 
and the “fĳ irst generation limitation”, as well as the way they are publically 
debated, teach us about the usefulness of “national models” in comparative 
migration studies? I fĳ irst summarize the results for each case individually 
and then draw lessons from the comparison. 
Germany, which has been marked by a long-standing quest for national 
unity – at the time of Herder and Fichte as well as after the Second World 
War – continues to struggle with the toleration of what is seen, by some, 
as split allegiance, namely dual citizenship. Thus, Germany has chosen to 
impose loyalty through exclusivity: as a rule, dual citizenship will not be 
tolerated. Many of its long-term permanent residents, who are eligible for 
citizenship, are therefore “choosing” not to naturalize. Even worse, in the 
case of Optionspflichtigen the law may force German-born youth to decide 
against maintaining German citizenship and to become legal foreigners 
in their own country. 
The dominant theme in favour of Optionspflicht is about “loyalty and 
integration”, which – as the comparison with Canada shows – is not unique 
to countries emerging from the tradition of “ethnic nationhood”. Rather, 
it seems to be a staple of citizenship politics and, in the German case, a 
political strategy aimed at Germans of Turkish background – the second 
most important theme brought forth in the debate. While this discrimina-
tory position is certainly rooted in ethno-religious stereotypes, the latter 
are nourished more by the contemporary climate of Islamophobia than 
romanticist traditions of nationhood. It is interesting to note that dual 
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citizenship for EU citizens has come to be tolerated without much political 
uproar (Green, 2012, p. 177) and that similar ethno-religious stereotypes can 
also be traced in the Canadian debate on dual citizenship (Nyers, 2010).
The current debate about Optionspflicht clearly runs along party lines, 
with all political actors seeming to be more responsive to party constituen-
cies than to ancient ideas about what it means to be German. Furthermore, 
the new coalition contract signed by the governing parties of Christian 
Democrats (CDU/CSU) and Social Democrats in November 2013 stipulates 
the abolition of Optionspflicht; it remains thus to be seen if and when this 
SPD election promise is to be fulfĳ illed within the next four years.
The conundrum that Canada faces at the beginning of the 21st century 
is the following: Canada has a history of turning the multiple origins of 
its citizens into the “glue” of its national unity, climaxing, in the 1990s, in 
the consolidation of a multicultural national ethos (Winter, 2011). Having 
rigorously pursued this path, arguably a little too naively, it is now struggling 
to contain the diversity of its (dual) citizens, to reduce the liability of the 
state for its citizens abroad, and to instil national loyalty and commitment 
in its citizenry. 
In fact, Canadian authorities are not only worried that too many im-
migrants are taking up Canadian citizenship for the wrong reasons (Winter, 
2014a), but also that members of its highly mobile citizenry might produce 
“offf shore” Canadians in the second, third and subsequent generations who 
no longer have any “meaningful connection” with their country of (second 
or third) citizenship. Hence, while the permission of dual citizenship re-
mains unchanged since 1977, the “fĳ irst generation limitation” stipulates that 
Canadians born in the second generation abroad to parents who are also 
born abroad are barred from holding Canadian citizenship (Winter, 2014b). 
Interestingly, in the Canadian context, the themes used in the German 
debate, namely “loyalty and integration”, translate into a concern about 
citizens having “a real connection to the country”, essentially meaning the 
same thing: a “thick” neo-communitarian understanding of citizenship 
(Etzioni, 2007), offfering rights and privileges in exchange of patriotism, 
shared cultural values (rather than merely principles; Pélabay, 2011), and a 
commitment to citizenship duties. As in the German case, we can see that 
the dual citizenship of some categories of citizens seems to be a concern 
to the governing Conservatives more so than it is to the opposition parties. 
Granting dual citizenship to Lost Canadians living in the United States, for 
example, was not considered problematic (Winter, 2014b). However, and 
contrary to the German debate about Optionsregelung, in the Canadian 
case there was no substantial opposition against the implementation of 
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the “fĳ irst generation limitation” when the law was adopted unanimously 
by the House of Commons in February 2008.
Furthermore, although the Canadian citizenship debate is ongoing – a 
new bill is currently under review – the governing Conservatives do not 
attack dual citizenship directly. This is not because they are buying into 
Canada’s tradition of multicultural nationhood (Abu-Laban, 2014), but rather 
because their electoral success is dependent upon the support of immigrant 
voters, many of whom have come to cherish the possibility of dual citizen-
ship15. As a consequence of party ideological and electoral considerations, 
we are therefore more likely to see “small-scale” attacks on dual citizenship 
in the near future, such as the proposed bill to revoke Canadian citizenship 
of dual nationals committing treason, “acts of war”, and terrorism (Winter, 
2014a), as well as the recent proposition to restrict consular services to 
“citizens of convenience” (Morse, 2014). The political strategy at work here 
is to avoid alienating large numbers of so-called “honest” immigrant voters, 
while also pleasing the Conservative Party’s traditional white, evangelical, 
social-conservative constituency. This attempt to square the circle has little 
to do with “multicultural” traditions of nationhood.
In sum, the analysis conducted in this paper leads me to share the 
widespread scepticism vis-à-vis the utility and adequacy of the national 
models approach in comparative migration studies. Taking ideal types at 
face value and associating the abstract model too closely with any particular 
country leads to flawed analyses. As seen here, the contemporary debates in 
Germany and Canada seem to be more driven by political conjuncture – be 
it party ideology, electoral considerations, or the global fear about all things 
(rightly or wrongly) associated with Islam – than with ancient traditions 
of nationhood. 
Specifĳ ically, the analysis suggests that when it comes to considerations 
of “good citizenship” both countries struggle with very similar challenges 
and share concerns across party lines, namely how to build a egalitarian 
and cohesive society in times of globalization. Rather than arriving at these 
challenges and concerns from opposing directions – as the distinct national 
models approach would predict – it seems more accurate to say that both 
countries are travelling in the same direction, but do so at diffferent speeds 
and, due to diffferent historic starting points and conditions, are currently 
located at diffferent locations along the way. 
In this sense, the impact of national traditions and imaginaries on con-
temporary politics of citizenship should not be fully discarded. However, 
it may be better to replace the term “traditions” of nationhood with that 
of “trajectories”. As Mouritsen (2012, p. 89) puts it, “reactions to crises (i.e. 
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perceived defĳiciencies of citizenship) are signifĳ icantly shaped […] by what 
has gone before, and political actors do the shaping in ways that reflect the 
shifting balances of left and right” (2012, p. 89). Political actors in Germany 
and Canada share common concerns about legislating “good citizenship” in 
times of globalization, but their responses vary because of their countries’ 
respective trajectories and contemporary circumstances. These trajectories, 
while not path-dependent in a deterministic sense, provide a cognitive 
and discursive matrix into which policy changes and their justifĳ ications 
need to be inserted. Hence, while citizenship indicators allow for fairly 
accurate snapshots and country comparisons, the specifĳ ic meanings and 
inherent challenges of generic concepts and instruments that spread as 
“best practices” from country to country can only be understood in relation 
to the national trajectories from which they emerged or into which they 
were injected.
What then can both countries learn from each other? What can we learn 
from both countries? In both cases, policy makers are aiming to infuse 
citizenship with meaning by restricting its availability. In the Canadian 
provisions, the place of one’s birth is being used as a proxy for one’s attach-
ment to Canada; only those born within the country (or who have undergone 
naturalization) are granted the privilege to have Canadian children, even if 
the latter are (also) born outside the country. In the German case, loyalty is 
being measured by one’s decision to renounce formal ties to other countries, 
by the proxy of having only German citizenship. Both provisions are out of 
touch with a world where people become more mobile and more globally 
connected. In this world, it is increasingly likely that people who are born 
abroad will have a connection to their parents’ birth country. Chances are 
also great that they will marry someone holding a diffferent citizenship and 
that their children will develop loyalty for both countries. 
In both countries it is also not dual citizenship per se that poses a 
problem, nor the place of birth16. As the analysis has shown, there are 
double standards at work that need to be eliminated. Citizens’ emotional 
attachment, loyalty, and commitment to a given country need to grow 
organically; they cannot be imposed though bureaucratic means. While 
proxies may facilitate the bureaucratic management of citizenship, they can 
only approximate, but never adequately assess, these admittedly desirable 
characteristics. That is why nation-building remains a multi-facetted and 
ongoing task specifĳ ically at times of globalization.
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Notes
1. I gladly acknowledge the helpful comments by two anonymous reviewers, the research 
assistance provided by Annkathrin Diehl and Shawn Jackson, and funding received from the 
Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. The usual disclaimer applies: 
I am solely responsible for all remaining errors of fact or interpretation. 
2. Strictly speaking, the “fĳ irst generation limitation” is not a dual citizenship provision as it 
prevents all Canadian citizens born abroad from passing on Canadian citizenship to their 
offfspring if equally born outside Canada. In practice, however, there are provisions in place 
to assure that this measure is not producing stateless persons.
3. The words Optionspflicht [the duty to choose] and Optionsregelung [the regulation requiring 
a choice] refer to the same legal provision; they will be used interchangeably. Members of the 
German opposition also refer to this provision as Optionszwang [the obligation to choose].
4. Documents were chosen based on relevance. The quantitative diffference in documents 
is justifĳ ied since the German documents were longer and richer in qualitative content.
5. Children born in Germany of non-German parents are to be granted German citizenship 
from birth, on the condition that one parent: a) had been legally resident for a period of eight 
years, and b) held either an unlimited resident permit (unbefristete Aufenthaltserlaubnis) for 
at least three years, or a residence entitlement (Aufenthaltsberechtigung) (Green, 2000, p. 113). 
6. Interpreting the new naturalization provisions at their discretion, in 2006, the conservative-
governed Länder Baden-Württemberg and Hesse introduced highly controversial provincial 
citizenship exams to “test” a candidate’s “internal dispositions” and loyalty to the constitu-
tion (Palmowski, 2008, p. 559; van Oers, 2010).
7. While the integration courses and German language instruction have been welcomed 
by immigrants (Will, 2012, p. 12), the content and questions of the citizenship test have 
triggered much controversy (Michalowski, 2011; Orgad, 2009; for diffferent positions, see 
Goodman, 2010; van Oers, 2010).
8. The notion of “choice” has to be treated carefully here as the individual cannot choose 
freely as he or she may wish. Rather, the possibilities for choice are embedded within the 
surrounding legal stipulations. Thanks to one of the anonymous reviewers for alerting me 
to this issue.
9. The FDP changed its position in the subsequent election campaign.
10. Themes are here discussed in order of quantitative strength within the debate, beginning 
with the most powerful.
11. All translations are mine.
12. Before 1996, citizenship applicants met initially with a citizenship offfĳ icer and were then 
scheduled for a hearing or a personal interview with a citizenship judge.
13. Examples are the Anti-terrorism Act, technologically enhanced permanent resident cards, 
and the Smart Border declaration.
14. It is important to note that the members of the diplomatic corps and of the armed forces 
are exempt from the “fĳ irst generation limitation”. Furthermore, the law contains provisions 
to avoid statelessness, such as by allowing (the parents of) individuals born abroad in 
the second generation to apply for Canadian citizenship on the condition that they have 
returned to Canada and resided there legally for at least three years.
15. Exact numbers of how many Canadians possess dual or multiple citizenship do not exist. 
In the 2006 Canadian census, 870,255 of 31 million respondents reported dual citizenship 
(Statistics Canada, 2011). 
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16. And this even for the second generation born abroad, as shown by the new provision for 
Lost Canadians who can pass on Canadian citizenship to their offfspring retroactively, even 
if the latter are the second generation born abroad (Winter, 2014b).
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